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Abstract 
Georgia offers salary incentives for K-12 educators to obtain post-
baccalaureate degrees, intending to improve student performance. In this 
paper, we evaluate the empirical relationship between advanced degrees 
earned by teachers and student pass rates on the state high school 
graduation test. More advanced degrees do not significantly improve pass 
rates. We conclude the devil is in the details. It is well known that 
educational performance is the product of the interaction of many factors, 
particularly family and socio-economic variables. Previous literature also 
draws only a weak relationship between teacher quality and salary 
incentives. Thus, Georgia’s experience suggests it is difficult to design 
effective policy that depends on indirect incentives to perform. Certain 
policies may fail because they are ill-conceived, or because interest group 
pressures interfere in their planning or execution. But sometimes policies 
fail because there is simply a limit to government’s ability to solve 
problems. 
JEL Codes: I220, I280 
Keywords: State education finance, Teacher pay, State education policy 
I. Introduction 
In nearly any comparison of educational performance, Georgia 
regularly scores poorly relative to other states  Publication of such 
findings is, as expected, followed by public officials announcing the 
need to improve public education in the state. State officials in 
Georgia had a promising idea: give K-12 teachers a monetary 
incentive to increase their formal academic qualifications. The 
reasoning behind the policy is that better qualified teachers will 
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formal education will enhance their ability to stimulate and motivate 
their students (e.g., Hanushek, 2005; Hanushek, Kain, O’Brien, and 
Rivkin, 2005). In turn, higher quality education should reveal itself as 
improved performance on common measures of educational 
outcomes, thereby addressing the perceived public policy concern. 
Despite Georgia’s laudable adherence to a basic economics principle 
– people respond to incentives – we expect this policy will not make 
a noticeable impact on student achievement. 
This study evaluates the relationship between advanced degrees 
for teachers and student performance on the Georgia High School 
Graduation Test (GHSGT). Using data over the period 1998 to 2002 
for nearly all of Georgia’s independent school districts, we model 
GHSGT pass rates as a function of educational, demographic, and 
socio-economic conditions.1 Our estimates indicate that GHSGT 
pass rates do not improve as more teachers earn more advanced 
degrees. According to the data examined in this paper, Georgia’s 
policy is an expensive yet ineffective instrument for leaving no child 
behind. 
This result may be unsurprising to some. The relationship 
between the formal qualifications of teachers and student 
achievement is too tenuous and too poorly understood. Although 
this policy is likely to be politically popular, for it to be effective, it 
must be true that (a) the state’s incentives are sufficient for a 
significant number of teachers to improve their qualifications, (b) a 
teacher’s professional effectiveness improves with a teacher’s formal 
qualifications, and (c) the increase in teacher effectiveness is not 
inframarginal; it is large enough to overcome the effect of other 
influences on student achievement. In terms of influencing student 
achievement, salary incentives are, at best, indirect effects. 
Nevertheless, our “non-result” highlights an important issue in 
determining and executing public policy. Georgia has acknowledged 
that people respond systematically to incentives, and has attempted 
to find a workable set of incentives to achieve a desired end. 
Georgia’s government has attempted to borrow the mechanisms of 
the market to achieve a desired effect. Conventional economic 
thinking would assess this policy as “smart” and likely to be more 
effective than other policies that ignore human motivations. 
1 Most of Georgia’s school districts are defined by county. Details are discussed in 
the empirical section later in the paper. 
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However, this example shows the serious difficulties a non-market 
organization has in creating de novo incentives that induce a particular 
behavior – to achieve a particular result – at non-inframarginal levels. 
Georgia’s expensive failure exemplifies a Hayekian (1945) 
knowledge problem (which one could also discuss as Alchian’s (1950) 
question of economic adoption) often found in markets for 
essentially private services that have become politicized. In a 
functioning market, rewards flow to the proven performers. If the 
market for educational services were more competitive, we would 
expect rewards to flow to schools and teachers whose methods prove 
more effective. Should these methods be reproducible, their adoption 
would spread through the market. If earning an advanced degree 
enhances teacher competitiveness, teachers would seek advanced 
degrees. Otherwise, teachers would not seek advanced degrees, and 
little expense would be wasted on additional teacher education. 
However, as the state has become the overwhelmingly dominant 
provider of educational services, such informational flows and 
adoptive mechanisms have been severed. To improve outcomes, the 
state must try to replicate market incentives, and must try to 
accurately relate incentives to outcomes. In this instance, Georgia has 
selected a plausible incentive, but applied the incentive in a difficult 
situation. Georgia’s policy provides sufficient incentive to motivate 
teachers to acquire more advanced degrees, but the policy fails 
because having more teachers with advanced degrees does not seem 
to lead to improved educational outcomes. 
In the next section we discuss the GHSGT. The initial pass rate 
on this exam is our measure of school-system average educational 
outcome. We then discuss what various groups and organizations 
within Georgia’s government desire as educational outcomes as well 
as the economic importance of incentives. In the following section 
we outline our data and hypothesis. Subsequently, we discuss our 
empirical model and the results from our estimates. The final section 
concludes. 
II. Georgia High School Graduation Tests (GHSGT) 
Since 1991, Georgia law has required high schools to administer 
curriculum-based assessments in grade 11 for graduation purposes. 
Accordingly, the state’s Department of Education (DOE), with input 
from the state’s educators, developed and administers the tests. The 
tests are based on the standards specified in the state’s Quality Core 
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Curriculum as established by the State Board of Education and 
revised in November 1997 (Georgia High School Graduation Tests, 
2006). In addition to meeting the mandates of state law, since 2004 
the state has used the language arts and math tests to measure 
Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) for federal No Child Left Behind 
reporting purposes (Testing Programs: Georgia High School 
Graduation Tests, 2006). 
Students entering ninth grade after July 1, 1991, must pass the 
English language arts, mathematics, and writing tests as part of the 
requirements to graduate from high school. Passing the social studies 
test is a graduation requirement for students who entered ninth grade 
after July 1, 1994 (i.e., the graduating class of 1997). Students in the 
graduating class of 1998 were also required to pass the science test. 
These requirements apply to all students, regardless of the type of 
diploma or diploma seal they seek (Georgia High School Graduation 
Tests, 2006). 
Eleventh-grade students have their first opportunity to pass the 
graduation tests with the fall administration of the writing subtest. 
The first administration of the English language arts, mathematics, 
social studies and science subtests occurs in the spring of the junior 
year. The data reported for the high school graduation tests are 
based on scores of 11th grade regular program students and represent 
the percentage of test takers passing the indicated section of the test 
on the first administration.2 The DOE also reports the percent of test 
takers passing all of the subtests given on first administration in the 
spring. Having discussed the relevant institutional details, we now 
turn to the policy’s stated objectives. 
III. What Does the State Government Seek To Maximize? 
In repeated instances, the state legislature has issued instructions 
to the state’s executive-branch offices to pursue policies consistent 
with increasing the academic achievement of the state’s students. For 
example, in addition to the requirement that students pass the 
GHSGTs to graduate: 
2 The state’s policy regarding initial administration of the GHSGT is that students 
take the test for the first time as juniors. If a student fails, she has two other 
opportunities to take the exam before graduation ceremonies in May. Presumably 
the lag time allows the state to grade and process the exams. 
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“The Governor's Office of Student Achievement (GOSA)… 
was established July 1, 2000, by Georgia Code… to improve 
student achievement… in Georgia. GOSA is committed to 
partnering with Georgia DOE in their mission to “lead the 
nation in improving student achievement.” Both No Child 
Left Behind and Georgia's A Plus Education Reform Act are 
built upon the principles of accountability and results; … 
[and] quality teachers in every classroom….” (The 
Governor’s Office of Student Achievement: About GOSA, 
2006) 
Similarly, the state’s DOE superintendent, Kathy Cox, publicly 
states her vision as, “We will lead the nation in improving student 
achievement” (State Board of Education Goals, 2006).To help 
achieve the stated vision, the Superintendent set a goal to recruit, 
train, and retain educators, to “ensure a highly qualified teacher for 
every classroom.” Consistent with both the vision and the goal of 
highly qualified teachers, the superintendent also states a goal of 
high-school improvement. In this goal, the superintendent wishes to 
“significantly improve Georgia’s SAT scores” (State Board of 
Education Goals, 2006). Thus emerges the state’s policy of 
encouraging more formal education for the state’s teachers. 
The stated objectives of the major players – the legislature, the 
governor’s office, and the DOE – seem to be in alignment. The 
objectives are to meet No Child Left Behind’s standards of AYP, 
increase the number of high school graduates, and increase the state’s 
SAT scores. Furthermore, there appears to be a consensus that one 
way to improve student achievement is to improve teachers’ formal 
qualifications. 
Neither GOSA nor the DOE Superintendent specifically refers 
to the GHSGT. However, for empirical reasons, the GHSGT pass 
rates offer many advantages over examining school district average 
SAT scores. First, the percentage of students who take the SAT 
varies widely from one Georgia school district to the next. 
Furthermore, those students most likely to take the SAT will be those 
most interested in higher education. Presumably, one reason these 
students self-select to take the SAT is because they believe 
themselves capable of college-level schoolwork. Therefore, focusing 
on SAT scores is equivalent to “skimming the cream” of the 
students’ distribution. Furthermore, in those school districts that 
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compel most students to take the SAT, there are few consequences if 
an uninterested student chooses to under perform her true ability. 
Taking these considerations together, we believe the SAT will be 
biased, while the GHSGT will not be. To graduate, each student 
must take the GHSGT. Students uninterested in graduating have 
already had the opportunity to drop out prior to taking the GHSGT. 
Furthermore, failing the GHSGT carries a significant penalty, 
motivating students to try hard. Accordingly, we believe the school 
district pass rates for the GHSGT are a very appealing measure of 
system-average student achievement. 
IV. Improving Achievement by Improving Teacher 
Qualifications: Incentives Matter 
One of the most fundamental lessons in economics is that 
incentives matter, i.e., that people’s behavior will change based on the 
costs and benefits. For most people, the opportunity to increase 
one’s salary provides compelling motivation. As discussed, the 
consensus of Georgia’s policymakers – whether correct or incorrect – 
is that more formally qualified teachers are more effective teachers. 
Given Georgia’s goals of increasing student performance through 
increasing teacher qualifications, then, if the state were to take 
fundamental economics seriously, it should pay more as teachers 
increase their qualifications, ceteris paribus. 
Accordingly, the state provides teachers with salary increments 
based on their years of creditable service and on the highest degree 
obtained. Most teaching positions in the state require a minimum of a 
bachelor’s degree. However, a salary boost occurs when a teacher 
earns a master’s degree, and occurs again with an education 
specialist’s degree, and occurs again with a doctorate (Ph.D. or 
Ed.D.). The state salary schedule for administrators and teachers is 
organized into seven tiers, corresponding to the academic preparation 
of individual teachers. The tier establishes a baseline for salary. The 
baseline is then adjusted by years of creditable service. Therefore, a 
teacher may increase her salary along two margins. She may increase 
salary by: (a) earning years of creditable service – advancing within a 
tier, and/or (b) attaining a more advanced degree – shifting to a new 
tier. The salary policy that has emerged from the political budgeting 
process gives teachers the monetary incentive to earn advanced 
degrees. However, the salary policy does not necessarily give teachers 
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Table 1: Key to Variables 
Variable Name Description 
Pass Rate Percent of juniors who qualify to graduate on 
Georgia's exit exam on first sitting 
Advanced Degree Percent of classroom teachers with a master's 
degree or higher qualification 
Student/Teacher Student to teacher ratio 
Percent White Caucasian (non-Latino) percentage of student body 
Students Thousands of students in the school system 
Pop. Density Log of the area’s population density 
Income Log of income per capita in the area 
School Revenue Log of school system total revenue per full time 
equivalent student 
V. Data, Hypotheses and Empirical Treatment 
Each of Georgia’s 159 counties has a single independent school 
district (often comprising numerous high schools). In addition, 21 
city school districts exist within the various counties (11 are fiscally 
independent of the county system). The data from some sources are 
available on the county level, while other data is available on the 
school system level. The smallest common unit of observation is the 
county, which is identical to the school system in all but 21 instances. 
For the empirical analyses, we incorporated data for city school 
districts into their respective county totals. Additionally, we discarded 
six of Georgia’s counties, Chattahoochee, Clay, Schley, Taliaferro, 
Quitman, and Webster, because their school districts lack a high 
school, and therefore lack educational data on graduates. Thus, our 
data set consists of 153 Georgia counties from 1998 through 2002. 
Our sources are the U.S. Census, Georgia Public Education Report 
Card, Georgia Office of Educational Accountability, Georgia 
Department of Education, and various editions of the Georgia 
County Guide (Boatwright and Bachtel, various issues). In Table 1 
we present variable names and definitions, and Table 2 contains 
summary statistics. 
The variable Pass Rate equals the proportion of students passing 
the GHSGT on first attempt. Pass Rate is our general measure for 
educational achievement, and represents the dependent variable in 
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our estimates.3 As discussed above, the GSHGT pass rate is a 
superior measure of achievement compared to SAT or ACT scores, 
graduation rates, or other measures of school quality, because every 
Georgia high school student takes the exam. Therefore, there is no 
“skimming the cream” bias (as with SAT scores) and no 
complications associated with cross-state comparisons. Furthermore, 
the test has genuine, meaningful consequences: failure to pass means 
failure to graduate. Also, because the test is administered by the state, 
district-level variations, i.e. grading strictness, grade inflation, etc., are 
minimized. A priori, one might expect that an average student should 
pass the GHSGT regardless of her instructors, and, ideally, empirical 
work should focus on pass-rate gains by the marginal students. 
However, the Georgia Department of Education reports the school 
system average pass rate, without additional comment. In any event, 
the mean pass rate for first-time test takers in our sample is only 62 
percent, which seems to indicate that even “average” students may 
find the GHSGT challenging. 
Table 2: Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max 
Pass Rate 760 61.79 12.42 18 92 
Advanced Degree 760 50.73 10.05 12.48 95.18 
Student/Teacher 760 14.99 1.75 0.90 28.90 
Percent White 760 59.92 24.58 0.97 100.00 
Students 760 9.08 17.67 0.363 124.28 
Pop. Density 760 4.31 1.12 2.06 7.83 
Income 760 9.92 0.18 9.43 10.75 
Revenue 760 8.69 0.15 8.31 9.14 
For the purposes of this paper, we measure a school district’s 
teacher qualifications with the variable Advanced Degree, the school 
district percentage of K-12 teachers possessing better-than-bachelor’s 
3 Please note that Pass Rate is the school system percent of students passing the 
GHST on first administration, and is not the school system average absolute score. 
It is possible that the state changed its threshold for “pass” versus “fail” over the 
sample period, but we have no way to verify whether any such changes occurred. 
However, the simple (as opposed to student-weighted) average pass rates in the 
five sample years were 61.6 percent, 61.4 percent, 64.5 percent, 58.4 percent, and 
63.1 percent, respectively. To us, there is no obvious evidence of pass rate inflation 
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credentials.4 Given the policymakers’ stated objectives, Advanced 
Degree should exert positive and significant influence on GHSGT pass 
rates. Suppose that a causal link and direct correlation exist between 
teacher qualifications and educational quality, and further assume that 
we adequately capture these concepts with our variables. Applying 
the basic economic result that people respond systematically to 
incentives, Georgia’s salary bonus for advanced degrees would 
motivate more teachers to seek such degrees. If the state 
appropriately selects the salary bonus amount, the state’s aggregate 
teacher qualifications improve, and the state’s educational quality 
increases. 
However, a priori, we anticipate an insignificant coefficient on 
Advanced Degree. This is not because we find fault with the chain of 
reasoning, i.e., that better educated teachers are better teachers, and 
that people respond systematically to incentives. Rather, we question 
whether an indirect policy intervention on the “supply side” of the 
educational market will have a significant effect. Educational 
outcomes are a complicated product of the interaction of many 
factors, and, furthermore, family and socio-economic variables seem 
to predominate.5 Regarding educational outcomes, whether a child’s 
teacher has a master’s degree seems likely to be swamped by the 
education level, income, and demographic characteristics of the 
child’s family. Furthermore, recent research shows that the 
relationship between education spending and educational quality is 
empirically ambiguous (Hanushek, 1986), and that teacher salaries 
and teacher quality have only a weak relationship (Hanushek, Kain, 
and Rivkin, 1999). Recent research also indicates that teacher 
experience has a greater impact on teacher quality than does teacher 
education (Hanushek, Kain, O’Brien, and Rivkin, 2005). 
Moreover, the state faces a challenge in appropriately setting the 
salary incentive. In public policy, the old saw about the devil and 
details seems true so frequently. Assuming the correlation between 
teacher credential and educational quality holds true (and the 
evidence for this proposition is murky, e.g., Hanushek, 1986), if the 
4 The Georgia Department of Education reports certification data across three 
strata of school system employees: “Administrators,” “Support Personnel,” and 
“PK-12 Teachers.” We use the information from “PK-12 Teachers” to calculate 
Advanced Degree. We have no additional information regarding the actual job duties 
of anyone listed in any of the three groupings. 
5 For an excellent, if aging, review, see Hanushek, 1986. 
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state sets the bonus too low, too few teachers will increase their 
credentials for the policy to have a noticeable effect. Finally, there is 
issue of “noise” in our data. The data available is school district 
average GHSGT pass rates, and the percentages of K-12 teachers 
possessing better-than-bachelor’s credentials. Using our data sources, 
we cannot separate out the number of master’s qualified high school 
teachers, for example, nor follow a particular teacher’s students. It 
seems unlikely that a contemporaneous increase in early childhood 
master’s-qualified teachers would increase the pass GHSGT pass rate 
for high school juniors. In short, our data compel us to estimate only 
the sort of “primitive models” criticized by Hanushek (1986). 
Collectively, these reasons lead us to expect an insignificant empirical 
result for Advanced Degree. 
To achieve a well-specified model, we control for a number of 
educational and demographic variables, including the student to 
teacher ratio, number of students, population density, district total 
revenue per full time equivalent (FTE) student, district median 
income per capita, and Caucasian (non-Latino) percentage of 
students. A large literature exists regarding average class size. The 
underlying, and perhaps naïve, reasoning is that students will perform 
better in smaller groups featuring more frequent direct interactions 
with the teacher. Although the empirical evidence is mixed 
(Hanushek, 1986), the variable is commonly used. We include the 
number of students and the district’s population density to account 
for economies of scale and scope, as well as any increased extra-
curricular opportunities that may exist in larger, more urbanized 
school districts. We also include district revenues, scaled to FTE 
student, to account for resource differentials across districts. 
Together, these are our “supply side” variables. 
Turning to the “demand side” of our model, we include 
demographic and socioeconomic variables. Family income levels tend 
to be strongly correlated with family educational attainment and, 
presumably, a family environment supportive of student educational 
achievement. As we do, many studies of student achievement include 
ethnicity measures (Hanushek, 1986). Frequently, a Caucasian family 
background is associated with greater student achievement. The 
reasons for this result are complex and varied. Our public schools 
may exhibit overt racism, or unwitting racism in testing or curriculum 
design. Wittingly or unwittingly, subtle racism may be present 
through educators having lower expectations for non-white children, 
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and/or “low tracking” non-white children into less rigorous classes. 
Furthermore, cultural differences may lead African American and 
Latino American societies to place less emphasis on educational 
attainment. 
VI. The Empirical Model 
Our data set is a panel of all Georgia counties from 1998 through 
2002. Though not ideal, our time period is limited by data availability 
and comparability at the time of writing. Since we observe school 
districts in cross-section and over time, two types of unobserved 
factors can potentially affect pass rates: first, unobserved 
heterogeneous characteristics of each school district; and second, 
unobserved secular trends over time that affect all school districts. 
Therefore, we estimate the model 
PassRateit = β0 + β1AdvancedDegreeit + βjxjit + δzDz + υit, 
where υit = ai + uit. 
In the model, i indexes school districts, t indicates year from 1998 
to 2002, j represents each of the demographic/socio-economic 
control variables, and Dz represents the year dummies for years z > 
1998. The composite error term, υit, is the sum of the time-invariant 
fixed effect, ai, and the regression error uit, which is assumed to be 
uncorrelated with the set of independent variables. Our main 
parameter of interest is β1, which captures the effect that more 
advanced degrees among teachers have on their students’ pass rates. 
Under these conditions, estimating the first differences of the 
model with ordinary least squares is known to generate unbiased and 
consistent estimates of the β and δ parameters (Wooldridge, 2002). 
However, to economize on degrees of freedom, we instead estimate 
the model using generalized least squares under different assumptions 
concerning the relationships among panels and within the panels. In 
our models, we consider whether the data variances are the same or 
different across the counties; i.e., whether the panels are 
homoskedastic or heteroskedastic. Accordingly, we present models 
with no correction, models with White’s correction for 
heteroskedasticity applied to the entire sample, and models in which 
the data has been clustered by cross-sectional unit and corrected for 
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empirically soundest procedure. Clustering the data allows us to 
estimate standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity, while 
allowing the observations of a single school district to be correlated 
through time. Furthermore, we also consider whether the data 
displays no serial correlation, common AR(1) correlation, or county-
specific AR(1) (listed as PSAR) correlation. 
VII. Results 
Table 3 presents a selection of estimates of the above model. The 
goodness-of-fit measures indicate that the models are well-specified. 
In explaining the dependent variable, three of the independent 
variables dominate. First, Percent White is positive and significant, with 
a coefficient estimate of approximately 0.3 that can be interpreted as 
an elasticity measure (a one percent increase in the share of Caucasian 
students increases Pass Rate by an estimated 0.3 percent). Pop. Density 
and Income are also positive and significant. Both variables are log 
measures, so their magnitudes also follow elasticity interpretations. 
As their relatively large coefficient estimates indicate, both Pop. 
Density and Income have large marginal effects. We believe the 
foregoing results will be of no surprise to readers. The rest of the 
variables in the model have small estimated marginal effects with 
little or no statistical significance. Student/Teacher has a positive 
estimate throughout, and is significant in Model 2 and Model 5, but 
in both of these models the square of Student/Teacher is negative and 
significant. With the non-linearity, peer effects and the usual benefits 
of small class sizes might work in opposite directions, and Georgia 
districts operate on the range on which peer effects dominate. 
However, we cannot test for this with the current data. Revenue 
shows up negative and significant in Models 2 and 4 but at low levels 
of significance, so we see little reason to put much emphasis on this 
variable. 
The variable of interest is Advanced Degree, which is of a very small 
magnitude and not significant except in Model 2. After controlling 
for student population, area population density, area income, school 
revenue, and ethnic make-up, school systems with more master’s-
qualified teachers fail to perform better on the Georgia High School 
Graduation Tests, ceteris paribus. Thus, the Georgia data from 1998 to 
2002 offer no evidence that additional credentials are associated with 
improved student performance. In fact, the results suggest a very 
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section. But first we consider some of the opportunity costs of a 
funding a policy that has no discernible impact on student 
performance. 
Table 3: GLS Estimates of Pass Rate 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 




























Percent White 0.308 *** 0.310 *** 0.301 *** 0.305 *** 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 



















Income 12.57 *** 11.14 *** 6.91 *** 8.42 *** 
2.61 1.71 2.12 1.45 
Revenue -6.34 -4.05 * -0.559 -3.71 * 
3.95 2.47 2.89 2.16 
Constant -42.93 -46.16 -36.89 -30.39 
37.50 21.59 27.60 21.47 
N 760 760 760 760 
Wald Chi2 1151.8 2426.0 1342.8 2773.3 
Log likelihood -2666.2 -2474.1 -2343.3 -2189.5 
Panels hetero-
skedastic? No Yes Yes Yes 
Panels auto-
correlated? No No AR1 PSAR1 
Year 
dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
* Significant at the 90 percent level; ** Significant at the 95 percent level;
 
*** Significant at the 99 percent level
 
Standard errors appear in italics. All estimates include year effects.
 
VIII. Policy Analysis 
Now we consider the cost Georgia incurs through the policy of 
rewarding teachers for acquiring master’s degrees. Evaluated at the 
sample mean, consider a single standard deviation increase in 
Advanced Degree, from 50.73 percent of teachers possessing a master’s 
degree to 60.78 percent of teachers possessing a master’s degree. The 
sample mean number of teachers per school system is 634.37. A one 
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standard deviation increase in the number of master’s qualified 
teachers averages 63.75 teachers per school district. To further 
develop our argument, we adopt the following relatively conservative 
assumptions: 1) all teachers who earn a higher degree earn a master’s 
degree rather than a doctorate or specialist’s degree, and 2) all 
teachers earn their degree in their fifth year or thereafter. This yields 
an average initial increase in state educational spending of 
$203,229.45 per school system for the 64 newly master’s-qualified 
teachers. The estimated total expenditure increase for the 153 panels 
(i.e., school districts) is $31,094,106, which would grow over time as 
these teachers continued to gain experience. Based on our evidence, 
this would result in no increase in GHSGT pass rates. 
More than $200,000 extra spending per school system with no 
impact on GHSGT pass rates hardly sounds like a bargain for 
taxpayers. Consider that public spending is rivalrous: Spending more 
on one politically desirable end usually means spending less on other 
politically desirable ends. For comparison’s sake, at an annual 
minimum salary of roughly $31,500, the state could afford to hire 
seven state troopers per county at the same cost (GSP-Trooper, 
2006). Each county could buy an outfit a new ambulance and keep 
over $14,000 for operating expenses.6 Alternatively, each school 
district could hire more than seven new entry-level teachers per year. 
Or, at an average total cost of $7,945 per student per year, the state 
could pay the full college costs for four years at one of Georgia’s 
public universities for seven students per school district per year 
(Average Undergraduate College Costs, 2006). 
IX. Conclusion 
Does paying teachers to gain a master’s degree lead better 
academic performance? Is Georgia’s plan working? We find that it is 
not, despite its exorbitant cost. Furthermore, government spending 
programs are rivalrous in nature. Within a given budget, more money 
spent on education means less money spent on environmental 
protection, or some other politically valuable end. As an example – 
one with which many career educators and professors will be familiar 
–consider that more spending on K-12 education often means less 
6 This figure is based on a 2006 mid-year purchase order by Henry County, 
Georgia. Available at: 
https://hcwebb.boca.co.henry.ga.us/boc/Archives/Minutes/June19,2006Minutes. 
htm. 
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spending on publicly-supported higher education. However, a salary 
schedule that rewards K-12 teachers for getting a M.Ed. would seem 
to please everyone. The K-12 teachers have a direct, potentially 
useful route to bigger paychecks. As demand for graduate degrees 
expands, state university education departments generate more 
graduate hours and acquire more state funds. Elected officials and 
bureaucrats have the chance to tout their accomplishments, having 
done something that appears substantial and pragmatic to improve 
education in the state. The general taxpayer either pays a higher tax 
bill, or forgoes other desired political goods and services. 
Unfortunately, the evidence does not indicate that this 
commonsensical, incentive-based policy is working. However, the 
taxpayer’s sacrifice is for a politically popular cause. It is hard for us 
to imagine a taxpayer’s revolt over a salary system designed to place 
better qualified teachers in classrooms, regardless of the scholarly 
findings. 
Nevertheless, the cost of this policy seems especially high. 
Suppose that the state chooses instead to spend money on needs-
based college scholarships instead of on an incentive for K-12 
teachers. Assume the (statistical) seven potential college students who 
receive funding would otherwise be unable to attend college. 
Diverting these funds from a teacher’s incentive to a college 
scholarship seems likely to be a Kaldor-Hicks efficient policy change. 
In terms of income returns and, from the state’s point of view, tax 
returns generated by the extra income, the money is better spent on 
college scholarships. 
We arrive at a “devil in the details” argument. Even when the 
state does something smart – and we believe Georgia’s salary scheme 
to pay teachers who earn better qualifications qualifies – it is very 
difficult to design a cost-effective policy intervention. Sometimes 
policies fail to achieve their desired end because they are ill-conceived 
or because interest group pressures interfere in their planning or 
execution. But sometimes policies fail because there is simply a limit 
to government’s ability to solve problems. Perceived deficiencies in 
society or the economic process will not always have a governmental 
solution, no matter how well designed the corrective policy may be. It 
is not really a question of determining teachers’ income elasticity of 
labor. The insignificant (or negative!) coefficients on Advanced Degree 
from Table 3 argue that relying on teachers’ formal qualification 
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certification as an instrument to improve GHSGT pass rates will be 
very expensive and impractical. 
Georgia’s expensive failure represents the Hayekian (1945) 
knowledge problem we find in politicized markets for private 
services. The normal market mechanism – changing prices – for 
guiding behavior is disrupted by the political intervention. As a result, 
the government must fulfill the functions previously performed by 
price changes. In Georgia’s educational case, the state has attempted 
a quasi-market solution to increase educational performance. The 
result has been that Georgia’s policy provides sufficient incentive to 
motivate teachers to acquire more advanced degrees, but the policy 
fails because having more teachers with advanced degrees does not 
seem to lead to improved educational outcomes. We conclude, as 
Nikita Khrushchev once told us, that “economics is a subject that 
does not greatly respect one’s wishes.” 
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